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Nation and the Myth of Origin
in Paul Tillich’s
Radical Social Thought^
A. James Reimer
Assistant Professor of Historical Theology,
Conrad Grebel College, University of Waterloo
The Issue
The question this essay addresses is quite simply the follow-
ing one: to what extent are the dynamic cultural and historical
ingredients of the so-called “myth of origin”—such as nature,
soil, blood, family, tribe, and nation
—
positive and defining
characteristics of what it means to be human and, therefore,
to be affirmed and incorporated into any vision of social jus-
tice even on the political left? To put the question differently,
in more Tillichian language, how important is the “whence”
or “wherefrom” of human existence, sometimes referred to as
the “isness” of being, in relation to the “whither” or “whereto”
(oughtness) of existence? Ever since the triumph and demise of
National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s, with its accompa-
nying atrocities, many have equated nationalism with bigotry
and injustice. Can one so easily, however, simply identify a
concern for elements of origin, like ethnicity and nationality,
with reactionary politics in the present situation? This is the
primary question of this paper.
The fact is that many of the major political liberation move-
ments around the globe today are struggles precisely for the
rightful place of soil, blood, family, tribe and nation. The Black
majority fighting against apartheid in South Africa, the yearn-
ing for self-determination on the part of the minority Native
population in Canada, the determined desire for the preserva-
tion of the French language and culture in Quebec, the Arab-
Israeli conflict in the Middle East, and Ukrainian nationalism
in the Soviet Union, to name but a few examples, all point to
the significant role which the powers of origin play in the con-
temporary struggle for historical freedom and justice around
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the globe. What the present global political situation demon-
strates is that a diversity of national and cultural-religious
groups are perceiving the political imperative (the ought or
whereto of human existence) to be not the breaking, let alone
the dissolution, of the powers of origin, but rather the very
opposite; that is, the full realization of those aspects of life
connected with origin.
What I want to propose is that the powers of the origin
—
that is, those dimensions of human existence which root us in
nature—are in fact defining characteristics of what it means to
exist as human creatures, both as individuals and as groups.
It is that which ties us to nature and to fellow human beings
and, therefore, to be taken with utmost seriousness in an age
of technical reason which uproots us from our origins. Further,
I want to argue that the root cause of injustice in the present
historical moment is not the affirmation of our various myths
of origin per se but rather domination by one configuration of
the powers of the origin over another. In short, the political
ought has to do not with the breaking or overcoming of na-
tionality or ethnicity in themselves, for instance, but with the
breaking of the domination by one nationality over another.
Justice, therefore, has to do not with the ignoring of the myth
of the origin, which is fated to be unsuccessful from the start,
but with limiting the powers of origin to their rightful place.
The issue, as I see it, consequently, is not whether or not the
myths of origin are to be affirmed—in a significant sense con-
temporary injustice is a turning against and the suppression of
the legitimate yearnings of groups for their cultural and ethnic
places under the sun—but, rather, the relation of particular
cultural constellations (including language, ethnicity and na-
tionality) to each other, on the one hand, and to the universal,
international, cosmopolitan human community, on the other.
It seems to me, for instance, that Canadian society is an excel-
lent example of a country in which the right balance between 1)
a universal federal identity, and 2) the legitimate claims of var-
ious nationalities and regional, cultural-ethnic configurations,
is still being forged.
I want to use Paul Tillich’s analysis of nation and the myth
of origin (as contained in his German writings up to 1933) in
defense of my position. Tillich has frequently been perceived,
especially in light of his own conflict with National Socialism
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and subsequent exile to New York City in 1933, as being un-
ambiguously opposed to the national myth of origin in favor
of the socialist principle of universal human solidarity, repre-
sented by the international proletariat. Such a view is based on
a superficial reading of Tillich. There is in all of Tillich’s writ-
ings during his German period, an underlying romanticism and
even mysticism, exemplified, for instance, in his view of theon-
omy as the presence of the Unconditioned in human culture,
his notion of God as the ground of being, his definition of re-
ligion as the substance of culture and culture as the form of
religion, and his understanding of good art as expressing the
infinite. Tillich’s radical politics, which took the form of Reli-
gious Socialism in which he attempted to bridge the world of
Protestant Christianity and a Marxist analysis of society be-
ginning immediately after World War I, is quite well known
and will not be discussed at length in this paper.
What is often ignored, however, is the important role which
various romantic aspects of the myth of origin played in his
socialist thought. ^ His fundamental critique of the bourgeois
principle as well as the doctrinaire socialist principle, which he
says ultimately grows out of the bourgeois principle, is that it
has lost the religious and sacramental substance and replaced
it with pure rational form. This critique of socialism is most
clearly seen in his by now famous 1933 book The Socialist
Decision^ which too often is read simply as a resounding con-
demnation of nationalism and National Socialism. In fact, it
was seen by some as giving much too significant a place to soil,
blood and nation, even though it was quickly confiscated by
the Nazis. It is to a few of Tillich’s relevant writings, includ-
ing his The Socialist Decision^ that I now turn for help in the
analysis of the issue as I see it. My own position is quite close
to Tillich’s although I think the historical situation, especially
in regard to contemporary national liberation movements, has
changed sufficiently to make Tillich’s conclusions incomplete.
Christianity, Socialism and Nationalism, 1924
In a 1924 article, “Christentum, Sozialismus und Nation-
alismus,” Tillich protests against certain nationalistic views
recently defended by the conservative Wingolf student orga-
nization of which he himself had earlier been a member.^ He
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objects particularly to the Wingolf’s uncritical identification
of historical Protestant Christianity with German bourgeois
morality, especially nationality, and warns that any such un-
mediated identification with German culture is a falling back
into “pre-Christian national religion” and idolatry. What is
interesting in this 1924 essay, however, is that, although he
unambiguously espouses political socialism, he, nevertheless,
leaves positive room for family, Volk (the nation) and Stand
(station in life). In what sense he does this will become clear
below. The most important thing to remember about Tillich,
however, is that any residues of the myth of origin that re-
main in his thought are incorporated into his socialist vision
for society.
After distinguishing three different concepts, which accord-
ing to Tillich are often confused in the popular mind—social,
socialism, and Marxism—he comes to the strong defense of
political socialism and Marxism. Political socialism must, he
says, be distinguished from the social conscience of capitalism
and be seen as a commitment to the radical political trans-
formation of the capitalistic social order. Marxism is the the-
oretical basis for such a transformation and consists of three
basic elements: 1) it is a philosophy of history and economic
doctrine which stands over against classical English economic
theory and both continues and restructures the German ide-
alistic philosophy of history; 2) it is a profound new analysis
of the relationship between spiritual-religious values and the
sociological and economic basis of society; and 3) it provides
invaluable insight into the dialectical conflict-character and in-
ner rationality of historical development. Tillich is a commit-
ted socialist and Marxist in all of these senses.
The problem, for Tillich, is that bourgeois materialism
which descended upon the masses in the nineteenth century
also corrupted this great Marxist vision and turned it into a
materialistic Marxism which, according to Tillich, spelled the
spiritual death of socialism. The bourgeois spirit which has its
most explicit manifestation in the capitalistic social order, but
which is unfortunately also evident in vulgar Marxism, empties
corporate reality of all spiritual substance, reifies the relation-
ship of human beings to each other and to things, splits apart
spiritual, social and economic life into subject and object, de-
stroys all immediate communal relationships, and attacks nat-
ural and spiritual realities such as family, Volk (nationality)
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and Stand (station), through the formal rationalization of all
reality. The masses—Tillich's term for the working class—are
the great losers in all of this since they are thereby excluded
from all spiritual goods.
Religious Socialism, of which Tillich became the key theo-
retician in post-World War One Germany, had as its aim pre-
cisely making the working class aware of this loss of spiritual
substance and calling socialism back to the concerns of early
Marx. Here Tillich makes a most provocative point. Religious
Socialism, he says, is committed to the struggle against the de-
structive despiritualizing effects of capitalism on the spirit and
life of the nation and the nations. It is this which binds it not
only to political socialism but also to what he calls “religiously-
grounded national movements,” even though in the end Reli-
gious Socialism cannot join these national renewal movements
because they do not go to the root of the evil. They continue,
without wanting to, to support the basic capitalistic attitude.
What becomes clear in this early essay is that Tillich, while
he clearly opts for political socialism and Marxism, still re-
tains some ambivalence tow^ard national renewal movements,
because it is these movements which correctly perceive the
loss in capitalistic society of something valuable; namely, the
loss of the irrational and mythical substance of the individual
and corporate human existence. Genuine socialism, histori-
cally carried by the proletariat, if it is to survive, will need to
recover its spiritual ground and ties to the dynamic structures
of being and life. What he is rejecting in this essay is not the
Wingolf student organization's legitimate concern for the na-
tion as such, but the uncritical identification of Ghristianity
with a particular nation. Tillich felt that both the Religious
Socialists and the Wingolf supporters of national renewal ought
to have this in common with each other; that they subject their
own causes and worldviews to the cross and the judgment of
the eternal.
Political Romanticism, 1932-33
What exactly Tillich means in all of this becomes clearer in
two articles which he published in 1932 and 1933, in the con-
text of the triumph of National Socialism and the Third Reich:
“Protestantismus und Politische Romantik [1932],” and “Das
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Wohnen, Der Raum und die Zeit [1933].” The idealistic think-
ing behind Tillich’s political theory is particularly evident in
the first of these articles, “Protestantismus und Politische Ro-
mantik.” He begins by distinguishing between two aspects of
being human: creatureliness and humanness, two poles which
he says are always present. The first is directed to the “where-
from ( ITo/ier)” or origin of human existence. Human beings
know themselves to be carried by a ground [tragenden Grund).
The power of the origin expresses itself here as Boden (ground),
blood and social group. It is what Tillich sometimes refers to
as the priestly-sacramental dimension of human existence. Its
trademark is the concern for space.
The second is directed to the “whereto
(
Wozuy^ of existence
in which human beings perceive themselves as subject to a de-
mand, or an ought, as being directed toward a goal
(
Telos). He
sometimes refers to this second aspect or direction of human
existence as the prophetic-eschatological dimension, in which
time triumphs over space. The important point here is that,
although Tillich clearly subordinates the priestly-sacramental
dimension to the prophetic-eschatological one, he, neverthe-
less, considers the former absolutely essential for meaningful
human existence. “Both moments,” he maintains, “are active
in every moment of human existence. We always stand within
the origin, and we always have to tear ourselves away from
it.”^
According to Tillich, there are two ways in which these
powers of the origin are broken: through the prophetic and
humanistic impulses. The prophetic places the “is” of human
existence under the judgment of the ethical “ought,” the “an-
ticipation of coming righteousness.”^ It does this still, however,
within a mythical framework. While transcendence remains it
is now not the holy transcendence of the origin but the tran-
scendence of the future. It is with an Enlightenment-shaped
humanism that the mythical is completely overcome on the
basis of human autonomy. Human beings now see themselves
as on their own. They take into their own hands the struc-
turing of the world, they critically and analytically define and
determine their own destiny. Even the ethical ought now loses
its otherworldly character and is directed simply to progressive
analysis and restructuring of the world. The rational system
of bourgeois society replaces the older mythical worldview.
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It is in the light of this theoretical and historical analysis
that Tillich now proceeds to his political theory, to a discus-
sion of political romanticism. “Political romanticism,” says
Tillich, “is the attempt to return to the myth of origin on the
basis of a broken myth of origin.”^ It is the attempt to re-
cover once again the powers of the origin without giving up
Enlightenment autonomy. This is the inner contradiction of
political romanticism; namely, that it wants to use the tools of
the Enlightenment to recover that which has been broken by
the Enlightenment.
There are, however, two forms of political romanticism: the
conservative and the revolutionary. Conservative political ro-
manticism is against anything new and wants simply to sanc-
tify the old. Tillich saw it at his time to be represented by
groups such as the farmers and farm-related craftsmen, the
nobility and the military, the priests and certain segments
of the civil service. Revolutionary political romanticism (into
which category Tillich places National Socialism) is represented
by those groups which have been completely assimilated into
the rational system but still yearn longingly for the powers of
the origin, a remythologization of consciousness. For the pe-
tit bourgeoisie and large sections of the myth-of-origin groups
which have been disenfranchized by the economic crisis, polit-
ical romanticism takes on a revolutionary character.
What is significant in this latter group is that for them the
rational system has triumphed and broken tradition. Techno-
logical reason is affirmed, however, only as long as it is useful.
As soon as the underside of capitalism becomes manifest and
threatens to produce a proletariat, this group rejects the ratio-
nal system in favor of the myth of origin. According to Tillich’s
analysis, the strength of political romanticism rests in its recog-
nition of the truth that being human always depends on being
carried by a ground. This awareness and the yearning for the
myth of origin as this ground becomes especially powerful at
a time when the rational system is obviously in a state of cri-
sis and autonomy has become for most an unbearable burden.
The weakness and contradiction within political romanticism
is that it can triumph only through the destruction of the ra-
tional system and lead into chaos and reductionism. This is in
fact what Tillich sees as the danger of National Socialism.
Tillich goes on in this essay to discuss how Catholicism and
Protestantism, both in its Lutheran and Calvinist forms, stand
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with respect to political romanticism. This is not the prim.ary
concern of my paper. What I want to show, however, is how,
despite his critique of political romanticism and his defense
of the prophetic and humanistic protest against the myth of
origin, there remains in Tillich an underlying ambivalence to-
ward the myth-of-origin groups. This has to do with his basic
affirmation of the metaphysical, ontological, mystical, or sacra-
mental ground of all human existence especially in the face of
the crisis of modernity. One might say this is the “religious”
dimension in his Religious Socialism.
This ontological and mystical element in Tillich’s radical so-
cial thought is most remarkably expressed in the second of the
above articles, “Das Wohnen, Der Raum und Die Zeit (Habi-
tation, Space and Time).” All three concepts— Wohnen (to
live in a house, to have a home), space, and time, are given
positive value, although in the end time is given priority; that
is, according to Tillich, space must give way to time. Space has
no abstract meaning but must be understood in its concrete
diversity as it relates to inanimate objects, plants, animals and
human beings. Space for plants, for instance, means something
quite different than it does for inorganic substances. Space for
animals, while concentrated at a specific point has much more
flexible boundaries as an organic growing entity than a house
in which one lives. For the space of animals a new character-^
istic is added; namely, that of movement, a movement which
can conquer and take over foreign space. Here now you have
duality which is not present for plants: the movement away
from the place of origin and a yearning to go back to primal
space, the nest or lair.
For human beings this duality is intensified. Human space,
while maintaining all the previous elements, now has a new
dimension: the duality between the inner and outer space. Ex-
ternally, human beings can break all boundaries of space and
have the potential for creating limitless or infinite space for
themselves; although they always voluntarily limit themselves
to a particular space. Inwardly, human beings become con-
scious of the desire to limit themselves to a finite space, the
house and the love of mother and home, on the one hand, and
the desire and need to leave home and mother and create infi-
nite space for themselves. However, to have and create space is
the way everything that lives combes into existence and as such
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space takes on primal and holy quality, above all that space
which has the character of preservation [der Tragenden)^ the
ground [Boden). One’s own house, the neighbor’s house, vil-
lage, city, country, and Volk (nation or nationality) all partake
in the sanctity of space which gives us our existence.^ Neverthe-
less, the space-creating power of human beings is also directed
toward transforming the whole earth into a house for all of
humanity. This is how space is related to time.
Time can never annul space. In fact, time becomes present
for us only within space. In “the present” space and time are
united. For Tillich, “Whoever has space has the present; the
person who has not yet found space remains without space-for-
life [Lebensraum]
^
lives toward the future, in order to create
for himself the present out of that future.”^ We have again
and again to forsake space for the sake of the future. Abraham
was called to leave his life-space [Lehensraum] to go into an un-
known future and thus, according to Tillich, becomes a symbol
for all of humankind. This is an especially important symbol
during the present social struggle, says Tillich in 1933, when
the gods and powers of limited and enclosed space resist break-
ing out into all-comprehensive space, the space of humankind.
As is evident throughout this essay, Tillich is here not rejecting
the importance of space as such, which is essential for meaning-
ful human existence, but protests against that absolutization
of finite space which struggles against time and infinite space
for all of humankind. What is noteworthy, nevertheless, is how
much weight Tillich does put on the importance of Wohnen
and concrete particular space or Lebensraum for human exis-
tence.
The Socialist Decision, 1933
How does Tillich apply all of this abstract analysis to a con-
crete situation—namely, the so-called liberation of the German
nation under Hitler and National Socialism? First of all, it
must be said unhesitatingly that Tillich earlier than most rec-
ognized and roundly condemned the demonic and pagan na-
tionalism within National Socialism. This is evident even be-
fore Hitler came to power (January 30, 1933). In a 1932 essay,
“Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich: Zehn Thesen,”!^ Tillich in
ten theses warns the Protestant churches in Germany against
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identifying with and supporting the National Socialist Party
in its suppression of socialism (theses nos. 1 and 10); against
justifying nationalism and the ideology of blood and race on
the basis of a divine order of creation and thus giving up the
Protestant prophetic principle in favor of a new heathenism
(thesis no. 3); and against giving divinely-ordained authority
to the capitalistic-feudal forms of lordship which serve to sup-
port National Socialism, thus prolonging the class struggle and
betraying the Protestant task of witnessing for justice (thesis
no. 4).
Tillich’s condemnation of paganism within National Social-
ism and his challenge to the Protestant churches is crystal clear.
Protestantism must preserve its prophetic-Christian character
by setting the Christianity of the cross over against the hea-
thenism of the swastika. It must witness to the breaking of
the sanctity of nation, race, blood and authoritarianism, and
place them under the judgment of the cross. What must be
remembered here, however, is that when Tillich uses the term
“breaking” he does not mean the dissolution of these aspects
of the origin but rather their relativization. Even in this article
of ten theses, there is a strange hidden ambivalence which is
implicit in theses nos. 8 and 9. In thesis no. 8 he maintains
that Protestantism cannot identify itself with any definite po-
litical direction and, consequently, must allow its members the
freedom to belong to any political party, even those which fight
against Protestantism in its ecclesiastical form. It must, nev-
ertheless, place every party, and all human activity under the
judgment and hope of the prophetic early Christian proclama-
tion of the kingdom of God. In this way, Tillich continues in
thesis no. 9, Protestantism can point those groups who support
National Socialism to the true goal and free the movement from
the national- and human-destroying demons that now control
it.
In his most important political statement, his famous book
of 1933, The Socialist Decision^ Tillich goes much further in his
analysis of the two roots of all political thought, ideas which
are already present in his earlier writings, some of which we
have discussed above. The first root is “The consciousness
oriented to the myth of origin... the root of all conservative
and romantic thought in politics.” This root has to do with
the cyclical law of birth, development and death from which
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none of us can finally escape. The second root is “The breaking
of the myth of origin by the unconditional demand... the root
of liberal, democratic, and socialist thought in politics.” ^2
What is truly remarkable about this book, especially in the
light of the political context in which it was written and first
appeared—that is, during the time that saw the triumph of
National Socialism— is how far Tillich goes in acknowledging
the importance of the powers of origin for human existence.
“The origin is creative,” he says, “... we are continually de-
pendent on the origin; it bears us, it creates us anew at every
moment, and thereby holds us fast. The origin brings us forth
as something new and singular, but it takes us, as such back to
the origin again.” Nevertheless, Tillich stresses the ambigu-
ity of the origin. This is what political romanticism does not
recognize or accept and this is where National Socialism, which
Tillich, as we have seen, identifies with revolutionary political
romanticism, goes wrong. It calls us back to an unambiguous
origin. But human beings experience, or at least ought to ex-
perience, themselves not only as bound to the origin but also
as freed from the origin by the moral demand which “calls for
something that does not yet exist but should exist”
—
justice.
Justice is the “recognition of the equal dignity of the ‘thou’
and the ‘F of the other and of one’s self. Herein lies the
ambiguity of the origin: that there exists an antinomy between
the actual origin (presumably what Tillich has in mind here is
home, soil, blood, tribe, and nation) and the true origin (jus-
tice). It is the split between being (the is) and the demand for
justice (the ought). This antinomy, however, is not an absolute
one because the true origin is the fulfillment of being; that is,
“Justice is the true power of being.” Further, the relationship
between origin and justice, between being and demand is not a
simple dialectic, for “The demand is superior to the origin.”
What distinguishes the spirit of socialism from the spirit of
political romanticism is that it takes seriously this demand for
something new (justice). Political romanticism in all its forms
does not take seriously the demand for justice but draws “the
spirit back into the bondage of being.”
Tillich’s book deserves a much more careful discussion than
I can give here. His analysis of the principle and inner contra-
diction of political romanticism; his examination of the bour-
geois principle and its attack on all traditional bonds of origin
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through a total objectification and rationalization of society,
that ultimately robs the proletariat of any connection with the
spiritual dimension of its own origin; and his explication, de-
fense, and critique of political socialism in Germany are all
relevant here. Nevertheless, I will limit my final remarks to
a few observations about Tillich’s view of socialism and the
nation.
The nation is a fundamental ingredient of the myth of
origin—not the nation as nation-state but the nation as a
cultural, linguistic, ethnic entity (as in nationality)—and for
Tillich is to be affirmed but never absolutized. Where the
myth of origin predominates, a particular space like the nation
is idolatrously consecrated ontologically. Here the prophetic
tradition demands that time be elevated above space. This is
what happens in prophetic Judaism which anticipates a “new
heaven and a new earth,” the new being which is “intrinsically
unontological.” The Jewish spirit raises time above space in
this way and represents the protest against bondage to space.
“The spirit of Judaism is therefore the necessary and eternal
enemy of political romanticism.”20 This means, according to
Tillich, that “the actual life of the Jewish nation, like the ac-
tual life of every nation, is by nature pagan. ”21
Although Tillich throughout this book is highly critical of
the absurd way in which National Socialism tries to create a
unified national tradition on the basis of the old-German her-
itage and mythology22—something which cannot be achieved
because of the heterogeneity of the Germanic past—and of any
attempt to give the nation mythic significance, he does recog-
nize the power of the nation as both an historical reality and
as a symbol. While the proletariat is ultimately committed to
an international human community, Tillich still maintains that
“The concept of a classless society... does not imply a society
cut off from the power of origin. Even in the society which
socialism wishes to create, the factors of soil, blood, and so-
cial group will be present.”23 Although socialism must protest
the ideological perversion of the national idea in the defense of
domination and imperialism, “Socialism must affirm the na-
tion more profoundly than nationalism can. ”24 This is what he
says about a socialist view of the nation:
But it is true here, too, that only what once had a genuine use can
be misused. The idea of the nation cannot be destroyed by pointing
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to its perversion. The idea of the nation has energies deriving from
the origin, and therefore has a claim to fulfillment—meaning not
uncritical support, but also not destruction. Soil, blood, tradition,
the social group— all the powers of origin are combined in the na-
tion. The prophetic tradition thus relates to a people neither in
such a way as to confirm it in its immediate self-awareness (as the
“false prophets” do), nor to dissolve it for the sake of an immediate
transition to a universal humanity (as bourgeois cosmopolitanism
does). It seeks rather at once to judge and to support the nation.
The prophetic is always addressed to all humanity, but it always pro-
ceeds from amongst a people, exhibiting thereby the unity of origin
and goal that is typical of it.^^
What Tillich seems to be suggesting here is that the way to a
universal human community is through the particular commu-
nity. In other words, one cannot get to the universal commu-
nity too quickly, without passing through that which is nearest
to one—one’s own family, tribe, and nationality. The problem
arises when one becomes fixated with one’s own particular,
or national community and no longer sees it as a means to a
universal, international human community.
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